Sunday, September 27, 2015

Property Case Digests


Case 5:
December 4, 1967
G.R. No. L-15829
ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, 
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications and JULIAN C. CARGULLO, respondents-appellants.
Facts:
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol, which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia., therefore dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. To do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.
Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, QuiƱorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.
The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from residents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and QuiƱorang Silab.
Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment in both cases against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public Works and Communications?

Ruling:
A private person may take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same within his property.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in the administrative proceedings supports the conclusion of the lower court that the streams involved in this case were originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban and that said streams were not held open for public use. This same conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an investigator of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and recommendations were approved by the Director of Public Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications.
The streams in question were artificially made, hence of private ownership.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5) of the Spanish Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of the streams in question, which may be classified creeks, belong to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban.
With the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River, admittedly a public stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them should not he ordered demolished as public nuisances.
Case 6:
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, 
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.
Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. The Supreme Court granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order, in favor of the petitioner, effective February 20, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.



Issue:
Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?
Ruling:
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement, which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.


Property Case Digests


Property – Case Digest by Jose Parcon
10) Board of Assessment Appeals v. Meralco, January 1964

Facts:
Meralco’s electric power is generated by its hydroelectric plant in Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to Manila. These transmission wires are attached on steel towers constructed by Meralco at intervals, from its hydroelectric plant in Laguna to Manila.

Respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers in Quezon City on land belonging to it.

Petitioner, City Assessor of Quezon City declared the said steel towers for real property tax, which required Meralco to pay the amount of P11 651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers.

Meralco paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which ruled in favor of Meralco ordering the City treasurer of Quezon City to refund to Meralco the sum of P11 651.86.

Issue:
Whether or not the said steel towers of Meralco can be considered as real or immovable property.

Ruling:
The said steel towers of Meralco does fall under any of the enumerations provided for in Art. 415 (NCC). They are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which then unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place. 

They can be separated without breaking the material. They are not machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Meralco is not engaged in an industry or works in the land in which the steel towers are constructed.

11) Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing, Aug. 22, 2000

Facts:
Respondent PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. filed with RTC-QC a complaint for a sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin.

Upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin, directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of necessary expenses.

In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with the word that he would return for the other machineries.

Petitioner filed a motion for special protective order, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.

The motion was opposed by PCI Leasing on the ground that the properties were still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.

In their reply, petitioner Serg’s Products, Inc., asserted that the properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Art. 415 (NCC), the parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the machineries sought to be seized inside the Serg’s factory remains to be treated as an immovable property under Art. 415 (NCC) or it has now become a personal property after the two parties signed an agreement treating the said machineries as personal property.

Ruling:
After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other party.

Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machineries in question are to be considered as personal property.





12) Meralco v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, May 31, 1982

Facts:
The case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1989 by Meralco. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco’s power plants.

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals, chaired by no less than the Secretary of Finance, ruled that the said oil storage tanks together with the foundation, walls, dikes, steps, pipelines and other appurtenances thereto constitute taxable improvements on the real property and liable for the realty tax and penalties amounting to P431 703.

Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in Art. 415 (NCC) and, therefore, they cannot be categorized as realty by nature, by incorporation, by destination nor by analogy.

Issue:
Whether or not the oil storage tanks owned by Meralco are considered real or immovable property.

Ruling:
The Court held that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.

The Court cited the US Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Atlantic City, which held that oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty. And that for purposes of taxation, the term “real property” may include things, which should generally be regarded as personal property.


Property Case Digest


PEDRO P. PECSON, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID and ERLINDA NUGUID, respondents.
G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the city Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to the private respondents, the spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred three thousand pesos (P103,000.00).
The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case No. Q-41470 before the RTC of Quezon City. In its decision of 8 February 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to the private respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was "not a subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the private respondents' motion to reconsider this issue, the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention that the apartment building was included in the sale.
Both the RTC and CA have ruled that the sale of the lot was valid. And both courts have also ruled that what was sold was only the lot resulting from unpaid realty tax, but the valid sale does not include the apartment building.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner, Pedro Pecson, while being unpaid of the cost of the building he built, is entitled to possession of the apartment building and its rental income thereof.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the private respondents, spouses Nuguid, have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner, Pecson, is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.

Property Case Digest


G.R. No. L-175             April 30, 1946
DAMIAN IGNACIO, FRANCISCO IGNACIO and LUIS IGNACIO, petitioners, 
vs.
ELIAS HILARIO and his wife DIONISIA DRES, and FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari arising from a case in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan between the herein respondents Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential.

After the trial of the case, the lower court, presided over by Hon. Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding plaintiff Hilario, as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants, Ignacio, the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.

The plaintiff, Hilario, prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendant, Ignacio, should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiff in the possession of said lot.

Issue:
W/N Plaintiff, Hilario, can validly opt not to buy the house nor sell the land, but instead order the removal of those structures that Ignacio built in good faith.

Ruling:
No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. 

The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. 

He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

The Law on Sales


The Law on Sales: A Report on Chapters 8 and 9

 Submitted by: Jose Parcon


 Introduction
This report is written for our subject, Law on Sales, under Atty. Maria Cristina Gimenez. The title of the book from which we based our report is Law on Sales by Cesar Villanueva. The book consists of 619 pages and published by Rex Book Store.

The author of the book, Cesar Villanueva obtained his Bachelor of Laws at Ateneo De Manila Law School. He also holds a Master of Laws degree from Harvard Law School, and Doctor of Laws from San Beda Graduate School of Law. He was also the Dean of Ateneo Law School. He served as Chairman, Commercial Law Department of Philippine Judicial Academy. He is also a founding Partner of the law firm, Villanueva Gabionza & De Santos.

This is the 2009 edition of Law on Sales by Cesar Villanueva, published and distributed by Rex Book Store. Our Professor recommended the book in the Law on Sales as our primary reference material for our classroom discussions.

This report will focus on Chapters 8 and 9 of the Law on Sales by Villanueva.


 CHAPTER 8
Sale by a Non-Owner or By One Having Voidable Title

In this Chapter, Villanueva states that sale is a progressive contract. And he likened sale to the metamorphosis that a butterfly goes through, a sale has stages as it goes through its legal existence.[1]

Stages in the Life of Sale
According to the author, a contract of sale has two stages in its life, the perfection stage and the consummation or performance stage.

The perfection stage is the birth of the contract of sale. It is at this particular stage that determines whether the contract exists at all and the nature of its existence whether it is valid, voidable, unenforceable, rescissible, or void contract.[2]

Consummation stage is the living-out of that kind of life that has been set by the perfection stage. If the contract of sale is valid at perfection, it remains valid throughout its life and consummation has no choice but to lead the life of a valid contract and the consequence thereof; consummation cannot change the nature of such contract.[3]

Breach and rescission are legal concepts that necessarily pertain to the consummation or performance stage. Because, according to the author, breach and rescission presupposes the existence of a valid contract of sale. When a contract of sale is void, it gives rise to no obligations that can be breached; neither does it allow a rescission to a contract that has no legal existence in the first place.[4]



Where the Seller is Not the Owner at the Time of Perfection
A valid contract of sale exists to bind both seller and buyer even if at the time of perfection the seller was not the owner thereof since it does not even exist yet or even if it existed then but did not belong to the seller at the time of perfection.[5]

Where the Seller is Not the Owner at the Time of Consummation
The Supreme Court, in Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap, held: A seller cannot transfer ownership by delivery of a thing that he does not own.[6]

Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that, “where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had.”

The law stems from the principle that nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.[7]

Sale by Co-Owner of the Whole Property or Definite Portion Thereof
When a co-owner prior to partition sells the entire property owned in common, the sale of the property itself is void, but valid as to his spiritual share. And when a co-owner, prior to partition, sells a definite portion of the property owned in common, the sale as to that portion is not valid as to the other co-owner but valid as to his spiritual share.[8]

Exceptions to the Rule on the Effect of Sale of a Definite Portion by a Co-owner
As a general rule, the sale of the entire property or a definite portion thereof owned in common, by one of the co-owners, only affects the seller’s spiritual share. The exceptions to the general rule are the following:

First, it does not apply when the subject matter is indivisible by nature or by intent. Villanueva cited the case of Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap, where one of the co-owners sold the school and its properties owned in common with other co-owners, the Supreme Court held that the sale of the entire property owned in common by one of the co-owners was void, and could not even be binding as to the spiritual share of the seller since the prestation involved in the sale was indivisible, and therefore incapable of partial annulment, inasmuch as the buyer would not have entered into transaction except to acquire all of the properties purchased by him.[9]

Second, when a sale of a particular portion of the thing owned in common is with the consent of the other co-owners, there is in effect a partial partition, and the sale of the definite portion is valid.[10]

Third, a co-owner who sells one of the parcels of land owned in common with another co-owner, and does not turn over one-half of the proceeds of the sale to the other co-owner, the latter may by law and equity, lay exclusive claim to the remaining parcel of land.[11]

Exceptions to the Rule on Legal Effects of Sale by a Non-Owner
As a general rule, in a sale by non-owner or without the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title than the seller had.

The exceptions are the following:

First, when the owner is, by his conduct, precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell;

Second, when the contrary is provided for in recording laws such as those embodied by the Property Registration Decree;

Third, when the sale is made under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;

Fourth, when the sale is made in a merchant’s store in accordance with the Code of Commerce and special laws.

Sale by a Seller Who has Voidable Title on the Thing Sold
Under Article 1506 of the Civil Code, “where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller’s defect of title.”

Villanueva submitted that the phrase, “title has not been avoided at the time of sale” refers to the consummation stage. Especially since Article 1506 talks of title or ownership to the property, since perfection stage of the contract of sale involves the obligation to transfer ownership, but does not cover nor convey ownership itself.[12]

Villanueva added that under Art. 1506, if the seller’s voidable title thereto is avoided after the perfection of the contract of sale but before delivery, the buyer does not obtain good title to the property.

“Title” as to Movable Properties
Article 559 of the Civil Code provides – “The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, ma recover it from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore.”

Even if the owner of a movable has lost it or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, and even if he offers to reimburse the buyer, he cannot recover the movable from the buyer who bought it at a merchant’s store.[13]

A merchant’s store is any place where goods are kept for sale; or where goods are deposited and sold by one engaged in buying and selling them.[14]




 Chapter 9
Loss, Deterioration, Fruits and Other Benefits

Introduction
In this Chapter, Villanueva discusses on who will bear the loss, deterioration of the object in a contract of sale. And to which of the contracting parties will the fruits and benefits accrue.

Villanueva traces the origin of where all these confusions came from. And according to him, the confusion of the prevailing doctrines on the risk of loss and deterioration, and the benefit of improvements on the object of a contract of sale was brought about by the convergence of opposite principles in common law and civil law.[15]

The Law on Sales in our present Civil Code is a combination of the Uniform Sales Law of the United States and the Roman law principle of the Spanish Civil Code.

Under the Roman law principle embodied in the Spanish Civil Code, the moment there is a contract perfected between the parties, and even without need of delivery of the subject matter, the risk of loss passes to the purchaser; provided that the sale is unconditional and the object is determinate or specific.[16]

This means that even prior to the time the buyer becomes the owner of the subject matter by delivery, he already bears the risk of loss the moment an unconditional contract is perfected, and the subject matter is ready for delivery.
On the other hand, under the common law, it is the owner who bears the risk of loss, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary. And ownership of the subject matter is transferred to the buyer from the moment the contract is entered into and the goods are available to be delivered to the buyer.[17]


In these two different legal principles between the common law and Roman law, the legal consequences from the point of perfection were the same: upon perfection of an unconditional contract of sale involving specific or determinate subject matter, the risk of loss, deterioration and the benefits of fruits and improvements were for the account of the buyer.[18]

Before Perfection
Before the perfection of a contract of sale, the rules on loss, deterioration, fruits and improvement of the would-be subject matter shall pertain to the would-be seller, since he owns the thing.

At The Time of Perfection
Under Art. 1493 of the Civil Code, if at the time the contract of sale is perfected, the thing that is the object of the contract has been entirely lost, the contract shall be “without any effect.” But if the thing should have been lost in part only, the buyer may choose between withdrawing from the contract and demanding the remaining part, paying its price in proportion to the total sum agreed upon.

In the sale of specific goods, and without the knowledge of the seller that the goods have perished in part or have wholly or in a material part so deteriorated in quality as to be substantially changed in character, the buyer may at his option treat the sale as either avoided, or as valid in all of the existing goods or in so much thereof as have not deteriorated, and as binding the buyer to pay the agreed price for the goods in which the ownership will pass if the sale was divisible.[19]




After Perfection But Before Delivery

Loss of Subject Matter
In case of loss, the Civil Code has adopted the common law rule of res perit domino that it is the owner of the thing who bears the consequences of its loss; but it retained the Roman law rule that ownership is transferred only by delivery, whether actual or constructive. Consequently, the general rule under Philippine jurisdiction is that after perfection but before delivery, the risk of loss is borne by the seller under the rule of res perit domino.[20]

The above legal principle is the same with the works of Tolentino which states that the risk of loss is still to be borne by the seller from the time of perfection up to before delivery of thing, but he would no longer be liable for damages if the thing is lost through fortuitous event.[21]

Structuring the Proper Doctrine on the Rules of Loss, Deterioration, Fruits and Improvements
The prevailing doctrine under our jurisdiction on the subject matter of a contract of sale generally depends on the issue of title pursuant to the principle of res perit domino or beneficial interest to the subject property.[22]

Prior to perfection, both title and beneficial interests pertain to the seller and therefore, he must bear the risk of loss, deterioration, and benefits from the fruits and improvements.[23]

After delivery, which effectively transfers title and beneficial interest to the buyer, the buyer bears both the risk of loss and deterioration, as well as benefits from the fruits and improvements of the subject matter of sale.[24]
It is only after perfection and before delivery that title and beneficial interests actually do not pertain to the same person since title remains with the seller, but beneficial interest actually pertains to the buyer.[25]

When the seller intends to have control over the goods until the buyer has complied with certain obligations, such as C.O.D. sale, or where the buyer does not intend to have dominion, use or control over the goods until certain conditions are met, such as sale on approval or trial, the general rule is that the owner must bear the risk of loss, which in this case would be the seller.[26]

Under Article 1189, even prior to delivery but where there is an existing obligation to deliver a determinate thing, since the accompanying obligations of the obligor show that he possesses the goods for the benefit of the buyer, although the seller has ownership still over the subject matter, the benefits and improvements over the subject matter are for the account of the obligee-buyer and in turn he must bear the risk of deterioration.[27]

According to Villanueva, the unifying doctrine on the risk of loss, deterioration and improvement, the same shall always be for the account of the person or party who has both title and beneficial interest over the property or subject matter of the sale. When the title and beneficial interest do not merge in the same party, then he who bears the risk of loss or deterioration, and who benefits from the improvement of the thing, should be the party who at that point in time is understood to have real beneficial interest over the subject matter.






Bibliography

Arturo Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume 5, Reprinted 2002, Central Lawbook Publishing.
Cesar Villanueva, Law on Sales, 2009 Edition, Rex Book Store.
Civil Code of the Philippines.



[1] Villanueva, Law on Sales, p.319, 2009 ed., Rex Book Store.

[2] Ibid.

[3] ibid.

[4] ibid.

[5] Supra, p. 321.


[6] Ibid, citing Mindanao Academy v. Yap, G.R. No. 17681, Feb. 26, 1965.

[7] Ibid, citing Noel v. CA, G.R. No. 59550, Jan. 11, 1995.

[8] Ibid.



[9] Ibid. p.327.


[10] Ibid. Citing Pamplona v. Moreto.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. p. 322
[13] Ibid. p.323.


[14] Ibd. p.322, citing City of Manila v. Bugsuk Lumber Co.
[15] Ibid, p. 344.


[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, p. 345.
[18] Ibid.


[19] Art. 1494, New Civil Code.
[20] Ibid, p. 346. Citing Chrysler Philippines v. CA.
[21] Tolentino. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 28, Vol.5,
[22] Villanueva, p. 354, supra.
[23] Ibid, p. 355.
[24] Ibid, p. 356.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid, p. 357.
[27] Ibid, p. 356.