Tuesday, October 20, 2015

People v. Secreto


G.R. No. 198115               February 22, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs.
JOSE ALEX SECRETO y VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
Facts:
On 09 July 2003, a tipster gave information to the Office of the District Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group (DAID-SOG) about the drug trade of accused-appellant at Libis Espina, Caloocan City. A team went to the area and validated the report. They saw accused-appellant sell Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" to three (3) persons. Consequently, a buy-bust operation was planned and immediately implemented on the same day.
At around 8:30 P.M., the team proceeded to the target area dressed in civilian clothes. Upon their arrival, the team saw accused-appellant standing in a corner near a small alley. Together with the informant, [PO2 Lagmay], acting as poseur-buyer, approached accused appellant to buy shabu worth P100.00 and handed to the latter the marked money.
Accused-appellant then gave PO2 Lagmay a small sachet of shabu. At once, PO2 Lagmay introduced himself as a police officer and placed accused-appellant under arrest while apprising him of the Miranda rights. PO2 Lagmay then ordered Secreto to empty his pockets and recovered the marked money as well as another sachet of shabu.
PO2 Lagmay presented the recovered evidences to the team leader, SPO1 Edgar Pamor. At the DAID-SOG office, the seized items were surrendered to the investigatoron-duty, [PO1 Llanderal] who then instructed PO2 Lagmay to mark the sachet of shabu sold by accused-appelllant as "RLR-1," and "RLR-2" for the other sachet that was confiscated from him. PO1 Llanderal took the sworn statements of the buy-bust team and likewise prepared the requests for laboratory examination of the seized items and for a drug test on accused-appellant.
At the crime laboratory, [P/Insp. Calabocal] examined the two (2) recovered sachets weighing six tenths (0.06) and four tenths (0.04) grams, respectively. Both were found positive for shabu, a dangerous drug.
After trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the chain of custody rule has been complied with by the arresting officer to warrant conviction of the appellant.
Ruling:
Obviously the steps outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence of corpus delicti were not followed.
That being the case, it is necessary for the prosecution to show that inspite of the non-observance of the requirements in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were nonetheless preserved. This was not done in this case.
The prosecution failed to show how SPO1 Pamor ensured the integrity of the seized items from the time it was entrusted to him at the place of confiscation until the team reached the police station until he eventually handed them over again to PO2 Lagmay for the marking of the sachets. Neither did the prosecution show to whom the confiscated articles were turned over and the manner they were preserved after the laboratory examination and until their final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Clearly, these lapses raise doubt on the integrity and identity of the drugs presented as evidence in court.
Further, on the basis of the testimony of PO2 Lagmay, the confiscated items were not immediately marked at the scene of the crime. More significantly, although these items were allegedly marked in the police station, there was no showing that it was done in the presence of the accused-appellant or his chosen representative. In People v. Sanchez, the Court had the occasion to emphasize the necessity of marking the evidence in the presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation. It ratiocinated:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
We cannot, therefore, hold that the guilt of the accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional right of the accused-appellant to be presumed innocent must prevail.

People v. Holgado


G.R. No. 207992               August 11, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, Accused-appellants.

Facts:
In December 2006, the Pasig City Police received reports of illegal drug activities of Roberto Holgado (Holgado) along C. Raymundo Street, Pasig City. After surveillance operations, a search warrant was issued against Holgado. Acting on the search warrant, the Pasig City Chief of Police instructed his officers to, if possible, first conduct a buy-bust operation before actually enforcing the search warrant.
In the evening of January 17, 2007, police operatives went to No. 17, C. Raymundo Street for the buy-bust operation. PO1 Philip Aure, acting as poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant, approached Holgado who was then part of a drinking session with two (2) companions. Holgado asked the informant if he was buying drugs while at the same time offering him a drink. The informant accepted the drink and introduced PO1 Aure as a drug user. PO1 Aure then handed Holgado two (2) marked one hundred peso bills. Holgado asked PO1 Aure and the informant to wait as the drugs were with his "kumpare" who was then in the restroom.

Holgado called Misarez. After some time, co-accused Antonio Misarez stepped out of the restroomand asked who was buying drugs. PO1 Aure and the informant answered, "Kami." Misarez then handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure. PO1 Aure examined the sachet’s contents and took out his cellphone. This was the pre-arranged signal to the other police operatives that the sale of drugs had been consummated.
Following their arrest, Holgado and Misarez were charged with violating Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs), 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), and 12 (possession of drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165.
Issue:
Whether Holgado’s and Misarez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 was established.
Subsumed in the resolution of this issue is the question of whether the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal. As this court stated in People v. Lorenzo:
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. Not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties will suffice. In fact, whatever presumption there is as to the regularity of the manner by which officers took and maintained custody of the seized items is "negated." Republic Act No. 9165 requires compliance with Section 21.


People v. Abetong


G.R. No. 209785               June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs.
MARLON ABETONG y ENDRADO, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
That on or about the 22nd day of August 2003, the Accused-Appellant, in the City of Bacolod, sell, deliver, give away to a police poseur buyer in a buy-bust operation one ( 1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.02 gram(s) more or less, in exchange for a price of P100.00 in mark money, consisting of two (2) P50.00 bill, in violation of R.A. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act).

Issue:
Whether the chain of custody rule in the handling of evidence, under Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165, was satisfactorily complied with by the arresting police officers.

Ruling:
The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the drug evidence.
The arresting officers unduly deviated from legal procedure.
It is beyond dispute that the date and time of confiscation do not appear on the markings of the seized items. It cannot also be denied that no photograph was taken of the recovered items for documentation purposes. It is admitted that no representative from the media, from the Department of Justice, or any elective official was present to serve as witness in recording the arrest. The prosecution’s testimonial evidence is likewise bereft of any allegation of efforts undertaken by the law enforcers to contact these representatives. Nevertheless, an accused can still be convicted in spite of these circumstances provided that a justifiable ground for excusing noncompliance with the requirements under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 has satisfactorily been established by the prosecution as required by jurisprudence and the law’s implementing rules.
Such justifiable ground is wanting in this case. No explanation whatsoever was offered by PO3 Perez in his testimony justifying noncompliance. Without this justification, it was improper for the court a quo to affirm accused-appellant’s conviction. To sustain the RTC and the CA’s findings would render the legal requirements under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 inutile and would effectively diminish the safeguards offered by the law in favor of the accused.


Republic v. Sandiganbayan


REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
199 SCRA 39 (1991)

FACTS OF THE CASE
This case gave rise to two petitions for certiorari assailing the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan in allowing respondent Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., to inspect the corporate records of United Coconut Planters Bank.

In the first petition, private respondent-stockholder Cojuangco requested the San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and its corporate secretary the production, inspection, examination/verification and/or photocopying of the SMC corporate records to inform him of the decisions, policies, acts and performance of the management of the SMC under the PCGG-Board. Since the shares of private respondent in the SMC have been sequestered by the PCGG, the former (SMC) sought advice from the latter on the effect of such sequestration. Subsequently, private respondent was informed by the SMC that all requests for the examination, inspection and photocopying of its corporate records should be coursed through the PCGG. The facts in second petition were substantially similar to above case except that in the latter case, private respondent as stockholder of record seeks authority to inspect and examine the corporate records of United Coconut Planters Bank.

The request of private respondent for the inspection/examination of SMC's corporate records was denied by the PCGG. As regards the corporate records of URPB, private respondent was likewise advised to course his request through the PCGG. Private respondent filed two separate petitions for prohibition and mandamus before the Sandiganbayan seeking to enforce his stockholder's right to inspect the corporate records of SMC and the UCPB. Subsequently, respondent Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed resolutions. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether sequestration automatically deprive a stockholder of his right of inspection.

RULING
No. The Supreme Court quoted Section 74 of the Corporation Code which states that “The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense.” 

Petitioners argued, however, that the Corporation Code has to give way to, as having been amended by, Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and related issuances as well as the pronouncement laid down by this Court in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. Presidential Commission on Good Government on the effects of sequestration. The Court held that nothing therein to indicate that the Corporation Code has been deemed amended, much less an implied modification of a stockholder's right to inspection as guaranteed by Sec. 74 thereof. The PCGG does not become, ipso facto, the owner of the shares just because the same have been sequestered; nor does it become the stockholder of record by virtue of such sequestration.

Monday, October 19, 2015

Timeshare Realty Corp. v. Lao


Timeshare Realty Corporation
v.
Cesar Lao and Cynthia Cortez,
G.R. No. 158941

FACTS OF THE CASE
1.  On October 6, 1996, herein petitioner, Timeshare Realty, sold to Ceasar M. Lao and Cynthia V. Cortez (respondents), one timeshare of Laguna de Boracay for US$7,500.00 payable in eight months and fully paid by the respondents.

2. Sometime in February 1998, the SEC issued a resolution to the effect that petitioner was without authority to sell securities, like timeshares, prior to February 11, 1998.  It further stated in the resolution/order that the Registration Statement of petitioner became effective only on February 11, 1998.  It also held that the 30 days within which a purchaser may exercise the option to unilaterally rescind the purchase agreement and receive the refund of money paid applies to all purchase agreements entered into by petitioner prior to the effectivity of the Registration Statement.

3. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the SEC denied the same in a letter dated March 9, 1998.
         
4. On March 30, 1998, respondents wrote petitioner demanding their right and option to cancel their Contract, as it appears that Laguna de Boracay is selling said shares without license or authority from the SEC.  For failure to get an answer to the said letter, respondents this time, through counsel, reiterated their demand through another letter dated June 29, 1998.  But despite repeated demands, petitioner failed and refused to refund or pay respondents.

ISSUE

Whether the issuance by the SEC of an authority to sell securities in favor of Timeshare Realty, at a later date, will have the effect of ratifying those transactions entered into, at an earlier date, without such license to sell said securities.

RULING
No.  The provisions of B.P. Blg. 178 do not support the contention of petitioner that its mere registration as a corporation already authorizes it to deal with unregistered timeshares.  Corporate registration is just one of several requirements before it may deal with timeshares:

            Section 8.  Procedure for registration. - (a) All securities required to be registered under subsection (a) of Section four of this Act shall be registered through the filing by the issuer or by any dealer or underwriter interested in the sale thereof, in the office of the Commission, of a sworn registration statement with respect to such securities, containing or having attached thereto, the following:
x x x x
(36)   Unless previously filed and registered with the Commission and brought up to date:

(a)     A copy of its articles of incorporation with all amendments thereof and its existing by-laws or instruments corresponding thereto, whatever the name, if the issuer be a corporation.

          Prior to fulfillment of all the other requirements of Section 8, petitioner is absolutely proscribed under Section 4 from dealing with unregistered timeshares, thus:
           
Section 4.  Requirement of registration of securities. - (a) No securities, except of a class exempt under any of the provisions of Section five hereof or unless sold in any transaction exempt under any of the provisions of Section six hereof, shall be sold or offered for sale or distribution to the public within the Philippines unless such securities shall have been registered and permitted to be sold as hereinafter provided.

Spouses Sobrejuanite v. ASB Devt. Corp.


Spouses Sobrejuanite
v.
ASB Development Corp., G.R. No. 165675

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. On March 7, 2001, spouses Eduardo and Fidela Sobrejuanite (Sobrejuanite) filed a Complaint for rescission of contract, refund of payments and damages, against ASB Development Corporation (ASBDC) before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

2. Sobrejuanite alleged that they entered into a Contract to Sell with ASBDC over a condominium unit and a parking space in the BSA Twin Tower-B Condominum located at Bank Drive, Ortigas Center, Mandaluyong City.  They averred that despite full payment and demands, ASBDC failed to deliver the property on or before December 1999 as agreed.  They prayed for the rescission of the contract; refund of payments amounting to P2,674,637.10; payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, appearance fee and costs of the suit.

3. ASBDC filed a motion to dismiss or suspend proceedings in view of the approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on April 26, 2001 of the rehabilitation plan of ASB Group of Companies, which includes ASBDC, and the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.  The HLURB arbiter however denied the motion and ordered the continuation of the proceedings.

ISSUE:
 Whether the SEC’s approval of the corporate rehabilitation plan has the effect of suspending the proceeding before HLURB.

RULING:
Yes. Section 6(c) of PD No. 902-A empowers the SEC:

c)         To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission … whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: … Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.

The purpose for the suspension of the proceedings is to prevent a creditor from obtaining an advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well as the interest of the investing public or creditors. Such suspension is intended to give enough breathing space for the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable again, without having to divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora. 

The suspension would enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the “rescue” of the debtor company.  

To allow such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.
 

Philippine Stock Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Commission


Philippine Stock Exchange
v.
SEC.
G.R.No.125469

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. The Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) had sought to offer its shares to the public in order to raise funds.  In January, 1995, PALI was issued a Permit to Sell its shares to the public by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To facilitate the trading of its shares among investors, PALI sought to course the trading of its shares through the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (PSE), for which purpose it filed with the said stock exchange an application to list its shares, with supporting documents attached.

2.On February 14, 1996, before it could act upon PALI’s application, the Board of Governors of PSE received a letter from the heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, claiming that the late President Marcos was the legal and beneficial owner of certain properties forming part of the Puerto Azul Beach Hotel and Resort Complex which PALI claims to be among its assets and that the Ternate Development Corporation, which is among the stockholders of PALI, likewise appears to have been held and continue to be held in trust by one Rebecco Panlilio for then President Marcos and now, effectively for his estate, and requested PALI’s application to be deferred.

3. In its regular meeting held on March 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the PSE reached its decision to reject PALI’s application, citing the existence of serious claims, issues and circumstances surrounding PALI’s ownership over its assets that adversely affect the suitability of listing PALI’s shares in the stock exchange.
4. On April 24, 1996, the SEC rendered its Order, reversing the PSE’s decision.

ISSUE
Whether the SEC has over-stepped its power and authority in ordering the PSE to list PALI’s shares in the stock exchange.

RULING
Yes. Notwithstanding the regulatory power of the SEC over the PSE, and the resultant authority to reverse the PSE’s decision in matters of application for listing in the market, the SEC may exercise such power only if the PSE’s judgment is attended by bad faith.  In board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, it was held that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.  It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong.  It means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest of ill will, partaking of the nature of fraud.

In reaching its decision to deny the application for listing of PALI, the PSE considered important facts, which in the general scheme, brings to serious question the qualification of PALI to sell its shares to the public through the stock exchange.